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Response Required 
 
 “For hundreds of years, international law has treated the pirate as a hostis humani generis – an enemy of 
all mankind
1”  
 You are a hardworking business and family man, using your life earnings to fulfill your dream of 
purchasing a boat for you and your family to go on weekend excursions on the high seas.  Your excitement level 
reaches its pinnacle as your family prepares to embark on their first trip aboard your newly acquired vessel.  
Your loving wife and nine year old daughter look on happily as you and your sixteen year old son navigate the 
open water.  Starting as a speck on the distant blue watery canvas, a smaller boat rapidly approaches your 
position.  Your boat is boarded by gun and machete wielding men.  Your family is defenseless.  Your fate is 
unknown, but the prospective outcomes include being held for ransom, robbed, raped, tortured, and murdered.  
 You are the CEO of a prominent shipping company and non-profit charitable organization.  Your 
shipping company ships steel products throughout the world over the high seas.  Your charitable organization 
seeks to provide aid, utilizing its vast shipping capabilities, to underprivileged and war-ridden countries.  You 
are sending a large steel shipment to Saudi Arabia, accompanied by a smaller ship containing health-aid 
supplies to be delivered to Somalia.  Both ships fail to reach their destination.  Your steel shipment is held 
ransom for millions of dollars.  Your well-intentioned supply ship is robbed and its supplies are never seen 
again.   
 You are the elected leader of a nation.  One of your most essential duties as the leader of an entire 
populous is to protect your home soil.  Tensions are high with a perceived enemy state.  Negotiations for peace 
have intensified, with optimism for an agreement quickly dwindling.  As talks expire, an attempted terrorist 
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attack on your nation’s soil seems imminent.  You launch a full scale investigative and preventive agenda.  You 
discover and thwart a planned attack by a terrorist group located within the enemy state.  The enemy state is 
very poor and underprivileged, raising suspicion of funding being provided by an outside source.  It is 
discovered that the private funding wasn’t from a billionaire political extremist or terrorist group with similar 
intentions. Instead, the funding was from a major pirate organization.   
I. Introduction 
Acts of piracy are no longer limited to random attacks by small pirate groups against unsuspecting sea 
travelers, but rather now apply far more broadly, encompassing organized attacks against individual boat 
owners, large companies’ shipping vessels, and potentially nations as a whole.  The hypotheticals above 
illustrate the vast spectrum of piratical acts.  While these illustrations detail acts of piracy worldwide, there is no 
place where these acts are more rampant and systematic than Somalia.   
Somali pirates are intelligent, resourceful, brutal, relentless, and above all, terroristic.  Modern pirates 
are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers and roam the seas in high-speed maneuverable skiffs that are 
supported by “mother ships,” enabling them to launch attacks from a distance of up to 500 nautical miles.2  The 
nature of piracy can be described as a “piracy cycle:”  
Piracy is initially conducted by small and independent groups of 
individuals using their boats for piracy as desperation of poverty dictates 
or as the opportunity presents. Success in this venture equips the groups 
with more and larger vessels, and an organization can emerge to 
coordinate their activities, these changes making predation increasingly 
effective. With further success the pirates' strength becomes such as to 
make them a virtually independent power, when they may choose to enter 
into an alliance with some recognized state. At that point the pirates have 
become in effect a mercenary navy, paid by plunder. Success will 
legitimize their power; failure and defeat will lead to disintegration of the 
organization into the small, furtive outlaw groups from which the force 
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originated.
3
 
 
 Somalia is a failed state with a weak, unstable government and no effective police force; thus, pirates are 
able to operate with impunity from Somali coastal towns.
4
  It is thus fertile ground for various forms of criminal 
activity, such as piracy.
5
  Somali pirates attack civilian ships carrying cargo through the Gulf of Aden, a body of 
water between Yemen and Somalia.
6
  Given the fact that the Gulf of Aden is a major shipping route and 
relatively narrow body of water, Somali pirates are able to cause hijacking chaos throughout the strip.  The 
modus operandi seems simple: the Somali pirates sail out of Somali ports, equipped with potent weapons and 
fast ships, attack ships by firing at them, and then board them to overtake their crew members.
7
  Over the course 
of the last decade, as will be detailed in the sections that follow, attacks by Somali pirates have resulted in 
hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom payments and lost cargo, as well as lengthy hostage standoffs, 
resulting in the horrible experiences and even deaths of crew members.  
This paper argues that a directed, global effort is required to address the increasing impact that the 
spread of piracy is creating throughout the world.  Piracy is a global issue.  The perpetual increase in global 
trade has necessitated a directly proportional increase in transportation of goods across the Earths’ vast oceans.8  
The Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most important and busiest shipping lanes,9 is approximately three-
quarters the size of the United States, making it extremely difficult to patrol.
10
  With the growing success of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia, pirates are now becoming more brazen, entering territory they never have 
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before and venturing further out to sea than before.
11
  While it remains true that there are a number of 
preventive and prosecuting structures in place, a more global and definitive approach to combating piracy, 
specifically in Somalia, is needed in order to prevent the potentially catastrophic effects that the global spread of 
piracy could result in.  Thus, this paper’s focus on Somalia is appropriate, utilizing its perpetual increase of 
piracy to signify the broader, global consequences of a continued rise of organized piracy.        
 Specifically, this paper looks at the global implications that the increased intelligence and resources 
available to Somali pirates creates.  With the increase of resources at its disposal, modern day pirate behavior is 
beginning to shockingly resemble that exemplified by terrorists.  In addition, and perhaps more alarming, the 
increase in the power attained by Somali pirates could lead to direct affiliations with terrorist groups.  In order 
to frustrate these realistic consequences of expanding piracy, the current international legal framework needs to 
be bolstered.  Authors in previous articles have addressed the need for a strengthened international platform for 
combating piracy, but have limited their focus to what is wrong with the current platforms in place, and/or 
basing their recommendation for reform to the creation or strengthening of one specific source for prosecution.  
This Author’s paper differs in that it suggests a globalized way of addressing the issue at hand.  If this 
reformative initiative were adopted, it would allow states to combat piracy through the use of numerous 
measures.  The purpose of this proposed initiative is to allow states who may currently lack incentive to capture 
and prosecute pirates, not yet recognizing piracy as a global issue, to have several prosecuting options available 
to them to utilize. 
Part II of this paper will address the characteristics and systematic nature of Somali pirates.  This section 
will glance at the current status of piracy in Somalia.  It will briefly address the systematic character of piracy 
attacks, as well as the measures taken in carrying out their missions.   
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Part III of this paper will look at the current international legal framework for combating piracy, 
including a look at the various definitions used for piracy in international law.  Moreover, this section will 
discuss the idea of universal jurisdiction and how it applies in customary international law, as well as a brief 
mention of the United Nations involvement in addressing the issue of piracy over the course of the last decade.  
Part IV will discuss the striking similarities between pirates and terrorists, as well as the affiliations 
between pirate and terrorist groups that are likely to result if the lackluster fight against piracy continues.  This 
section will look at the collapsed infrastructure of Somalia, arguing for a global initiative to reverse Somalia’s 
continuously deteriorating economic and policing climate.  In addition, it will detail the shocking statistics 
related to the increase in organized pirate attacks over the course of the last five years.  Most importantly, this 
section will draw both current and prospective corollaries between terrorism and piracy, cognizant of the more 
profound global impact that terrorist groups have had around the world in recent years.   
Lastly, Part V will look at the preventive and prosecuting options that must be made available to combat 
piracy.  More specifically, this section will advocate the importance of expanding the definition of piracy, 
including piracy within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), utilizing support systems 
such as international maritime organizations, and continuing the use of domestic prosecutions and regional 
partnerships.   
This paper will conclude that piracy is escalating into its own form of terrorism.  The increasing 
membership, resources, and weaponry garnered by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden are resulting in the 
formation of full-scale pirate organizations.  The regulating procedures currently in place are not sufficient 
enough to prevent Somali pirates from creating potentially destructive relationships with known terrorist 
groups.  In order to prevent such relationships, this paper argues that piracy needs to be treated as a global issue 
5 
 
of high priority, requiring immediate attention.  Recognition of the issue is not enough.  To defeat the spread of 
piracy, a collective international effort is necessary.  
II. Piracy in Somalia – A Failed State as a Breeding Ground for Organized Piracy 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Somalia is a failed state.  It has not had a stable government since 
1991.
12
  Somalia’s condition as a failed state, lacking a stable government or law enforcement system, has 
created a foundation for piracy to flourish and the type of people who embody the status of “pirate” to vary.   
The individual pirates who fill the ranks of Somali pirate crews are sometimes trained fighters who 
honed their skills during the last two decades of brutal conflict in their nation; other pirates are merely youths 
working their way up the ladder of a criminal organization, feeding portions of their ransom money to those 
above them.
13
  Somali pirates operate mostly in the Gulf of Aden, which is also a major global shipping route.
14
  
Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa, making it difficult to patrol, and it is populated by coastal towns 
where pirates easily blend in with other insurgent groups.
15
   
In the modern age, there are two types of pirates that are seen.
16
  While the first type, unorganized 
pirates that typically keep their activities within territorial and port waters
17
 still exist, the Somali pirates’ 
tactical operations have evolved.
18
  The other type is more like international maritime crime syndicates that 
typically seek to steal entire vessels, rather than just the cash and other goods on board.
19
  Pirates have begun to 
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capture larger vessels, which they use as the “mother-ships” to launch their tiny skiffs throughout hundreds of 
miles in the Indian Ocean.
20
  From this locus of control, smaller craft are dispersed in search of targets, 
ostensibly creating search quadrants with their GPS equipment and coordinating their attack with satellite 
telephones.
21
   
Once they have overtaken the victim vessel, the pirates typically hijack the vessel’s cargo and kidnap the 
crewmembers.
22
  Most cargo ship crews are not equipped with defensive weapons and not trained to fight 
pirates.
23
  The cargo is often resold to willing buyers or held for ransom.
24
  While the amounts of ransom 
demanded are increasing, the average ranges from half a million to two million dollars.
25
  In most cases, pirates 
and shipping companies negotiate the ransom, which is paid in cash.
26
  Somali pirates appear to take ships 
purely for financial gain, resolving most hijackings with a ransom payment and treating captives well.
27
  
Normally, crewmembers are released unharmed.
28
  However, there are a number of pirate hijackings that have 
resulted in the brutal deaths of those captured,
29
 and those who have survived have described a horrific ordeal.
30
  
 Piracy is a lucrative business: reports indicate that a single seizure of a ship can earn each individual 
pirate up to $150,000.
31
  Poverty is rampant in Somalia.
32
  Yearly earnings average about $600.
33
  Thus, the 
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surge of piracy in Somalia seems to be driven by poverty and fueled by the lack of a government and criminal 
law enforcement mechanism.
34
 Presenting employment as a pirate to a Somali civilian, currently earning $600, 
with the potential of earning $150,000 for a successfully completed attack, is a proposition that is difficult to 
refuse.  
 Although this paper argues that the current international framework is insufficient for combating the 
evolved, organized, and brutalized type of piracy detailed above, this Author recognizes that the international 
community has begun to take notice of this growing issue. 
III. Current International Legal Framework for Combating Piracy 
International law has recognized the importance of addressing piracy, providing definitions, 
jurisdictional guidelines, and procedures to follow in capturing and prosecuting pirates.   
A. Piracy Defined 
Although no authoritative definition exists, Paper 15 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and 
Paper 101 of the 1982 Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) both contain the most 
universally accepted definition of piracy. 
(1) Any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or aircraft; (b) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
35
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UNCLOS, while not ratified by all countries, including the United States, nonetheless represents “the best 
evidence of international law relating to the maritime regime, and is therefore binding on all nations.”36  Under 
UNCLOS, an act must satisfy four criteria in order to constitute piracy: it must: (1) be committed on the high 
seas, (2) be of a violent nature, (3) include at least two vessels, and (4) be committed for solely private aims.
37
  
While it is undoubtedly recognized that the above definition reflects international custom as it stands today,
38
 it 
is highly restrictive and will prevent hurdles if, as this paper argues, more stringent preventive and prosecutorial 
measures are adopted.   
First, there is a fundamental issue with limiting the definition to the “high seas” and excluding areas 
inside territorial waters.  If an attack occurs within territorial waters, that attack is exclusively under the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state who “owns” those waters.39  Because the crime of piracy is closely linked to the 
idea of universal jurisdiction, if the scope of piracy extends into a state’s territorial waters, the universality of 
the crime collides with the territorial sovereignty of that state.
40
  However, the limitation of pursuing piracy “on 
the high seas” creates a situation where any foreign vessel pursuing a suspected pirate boat must cease that 
pursuit as soon as the suspected boat crosses into those territorial waters, even if the pursuing boat knows there 
will be no further pursuit by the State who owns those territorial waters.
41
   
The additional requirement of being committed for “private aims” also creates an issue of limitation 
regarding the scope of applicability of this definition of piracy.  Scholars argue that this requirement disqualifies 
acts committed for political and ideological reasons from being considered piracy.
42
  If a piracy-act is 
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committed by a group with links to a specific state, the state action character of the act would defeat the wholly 
private aims requirement of UNCLOS because of the alleged link between piracy and state action.
43
 This 
restriction is especially problematic if, as this Author believes they will, Somali pirates begin to form 
allegiances with terrorist groups who have political or ideological motivations. Any affiliation with a terrorist 
group that maintains a political or ideological agenda, whether sponsored or unsponsored by a nation state, will 
remove the piracy group from the prosecutorial grasp of UNCLOS.      
 Aware of the aforementioned issues, the international maritime community recognized the need to 
expand the definition of piracy and drafted the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation Convention (“SUA Convention”).44  While recognizing that its practical reach may prove limited 
because of its lack of universal acceptance and ratification,
45
 as well as the fact that it is considered an anti-
terrorist treaty,
46
 it is important to acknowledge that the SUA Convention was enacted, at least in part, to ensure 
that politically motivated attacks on ships could be prosecuted by the international community as acts of 
piracy.
47
  Under the SUA Convention, an act can qualify as “piracy” even though it is not committed on the 
high seas.
48
  In addition, the SUA Convention does not have the private aims requirement of the Convention on 
the High Seas/UNCLOS treaties; thus, maritime terrorist acts driven by politics and ideology, and not simply 
private aims, would fall within the SUA Convention framework.
49
  Although this definition has yet to attain the 
status of customary international law, the fact that the SUA convention expanded the definition of piracy, 
especially within the framework of an anti-terrorist treaty, is an important formational tool for expanding the 
scope of piracy moving forward.  
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B. Universal Jurisdiction 
For centuries, nations have deemed pirates to be hostis humani generis (enemies of all mankind), such 
that any nation may use its own domestic laws to try to punish those committing piracy, regardless of the 
pirates’ nationalities or where the piratical acts took place.50  Piracy is the original “universal jurisdiction” 
crime.
51
  Traditionally, to prosecute a person for a crime, a nation needs a nexus to the crime, the alleged 
offender, or the victim.
52
 Universal jurisdiction allows any nation to prosecute offenders for certain crimes even 
when the prosecuting nation lacks a traditional nexus.
53
  The rationale for granting universal jurisdiction is that 
piracy is usually committed only aboard vessels on the high seas or any place outside a state’s jurisdiction, and 
states, their rights being infringed by pirates acting outside the authority of any other state, therefore may patrol 
the high seas for pirates without violating any state’s territorial sovereignty.54  Thus, under traditional 
customary law, piracy is viewed as a heinous crime against all nations and any state, acting as a global agent on 
behalf of all nations, can choose to prosecute the offending pirate.
55
  Unfortunately, customary law is only half 
of the authority taken into consideration when addressing jurisdiction under international law.   
Treaty law and domestic laws curtail the customary law conception of piracy.
56
  While UNCLOS 
specifically authorizes the capturing nation to prosecute pirates,
57
 other states, such as a third-party state willing 
to accept the transfer of the captured pirate for prosecution in their state, are not authorized to.
58
  Under 
UNCLOS, the legality of this type of transfer is dubious because only the capturing state holds jurisdiction over 
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captured pirates and receiving states do not.
59
  Likewise, many domestic statutes limit the jurisdictional reach 
over pirates to acts committed against that nation.  For example, the United States piracy statute limits the U.S. 
jurisdictional ability to prosecute pirates to situations where pirates somehow acted against U.S. interests.
60
  Just 
as in its definitional scope, the SUA takes an expanded approach in the jurisdiction granted to member states.  
Specifically, member states to the SUA have an obligation to extradite or prosecute persons accused of behavior 
that qualifies as piracy.
61
  It is precisely this framework that the SUA adopts that must be universally recognized 
and adopted moving forward in order to foster jurisdictional assertions from states over captured pirates.  
C. United Nations Involvement 
There is little doubt of a heightened global awareness of the escalating issue of piracy.  That notion is 
supported by the increased efforts taken by the United Nations in recent years.  In 2008, the UN Security 
Council passed five resolutions (1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851).
62
  The Security Council passed these resolutions 
pursuant to their powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to address issues posing a threat to international peace 
and security.
63
  The U.N. Security Resolutions (“the Resolutions”) expand the geographical area in which 
pirates can be effectively apprehended.
64
  The Resolutions allow patrolling nations to penetrate the Somali 
mainland in their piracy-fighting operations, as well as to engage in the hot pursuit of pirates in Somali 
territory.
65
  Resolution 1816 called on all members to use “all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and 
armed robbery.”66 It authorizes warships to chase pirates into Somali territorial waters if necessary.67  
Resolution 1851 extended the authority of military force to land-based operations for the purpose of suppressing 
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acts of piracy and armed robbery for a one-year period.
68
  Resolution 1838 asks “any nations with military 
capabilities in the area to ‘actively fight piracy’ on the high seas off Somalia.”69  Resolution 1844 allows the 
freezing of accounts and the prevention of entry into state’s territories by anyone who has “engage[ed] in or 
provid[ed] support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia,” or anyone “obstructing the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia.”70  Lastly, Resolution 1846 grants states and regional 
organizations the right to use “all necessary means” to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia for one year.71   
Collectively, the Resolutions are an important legal tool for piracy-fighting countries because they 
extend jurisdiction to capture pirates into an otherwise prohibited zone: the Somali territorial waters and 
mainland.
72
  It is recognized that the scope of the Resolutions were limited to Somalia on a six month to one-
year basis and required the consent of Somalia’s transitional government.  However, that does not minimize the 
importance of the Resolutions as tools to bring pirates to justice and as foundational guidelines for bodies of 
international law.  The expansion of the fight against piracy into the Somali territorial waters and mainland is 
precisely the authoritative measures that must be adopted and universally supported in order to reach not only 
the lower level pirate, but the organizational masterminds taking refuge on shore.   
The various bodies of international law have provided a framework and tolerance for expansion in 
recent years that can be used as momentum in creating a more successful global initiative against piracy.  
Before addressing what this global initiative is, however, it is important to understand the extreme conditions in 
Somalia and how those conditions have driven an exponential increase in piracy and potential for terrorist 
affiliations.   
IV. Pirates taking on Terroristic Characteristics and Affiliations 
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Somali pirates have always had characteristics that resemble those of terrorists.  However, as time has 
evolved, so have the organizational structures and extreme measures taken by Somali pirates, resulting in an 
even closer resemblance to terrorist groups.  The current political and economic state of Somalia assists in 
understanding why the country is a breeding ground for well-structured piracy organizations.  In addition, the 
alarming statistics regarding the rise in piracy in the Gulf of Aden illustrates the necessity for the international 
community to take a more proactive approach in combating piracy.   
A. Somalia’s Failed Infrastructure Fostering an Alarming Rise in Piracy 
Since the early 1990’s, Somalia has not had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently 
battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the country.
73
  After the fall of its former leader (in 
1991), Somali General Muhammad Siad Barre,
74
 Somalia descended into anarchy and was considered by most 
of the developed world to be a failed state.
75
  The local warlords who toppled the Barre regime began a constant 
conflict amongst themselves.
76
  The cost of this infighting can be tallied in the hundreds of thousands of civilian 
lives lost and in the nationwide destruction of infrastructure.
77
   
Multiple attempts have been made by the international community to stabilize the region and all have 
been met with failure.
78
  After the 1991 collapse of Somalia’s government, the country was fractured into 
several different regions.
79
  Control of each has depended largely upon military might.
80
  Those individuals in 
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power within these separate and distinct regions required a revenue stream to finance their militias on the 
ground.
81
  Piracy and fishing have each contributed to the funding of militia operations in Somalia.
82
      
In order for piracy to be lucrative and have a low potential for capture, there must be an “enabling 
environment.”83  Somalia does not have a functional economy, and its official law enforcement operations are 
slim, with gangs of paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets.
84
  In sum, the violent history of 
Somalia and its people, combined with a near limitless supply of military hardware and a lack of viable 
employment opportunities, has created an environment fraught with the desperation needed for fostering 
piracy.
85
   
The rise in piracy throughout the last five years is alarming.  In 2008 alone, piracy attacks increased by 
200%,
86
 and the first few months of 2009 saw dozens of piracy attacks not only in the Gulf of Aden, but also 
farther out in the Indian Ocean.
87
  In 2010, more hostages were taken at sea than any other year on record, with 
1,181 total hostages taken, and eight killed.
88
  Four-hundred forty-five ships (445) were attacked and 53 ships 
were hijacked in 2010, and Somalia was responsible for 92% of those seizures, accounting for 49 vessels 
hijacked and 1,016 crew members taken hostage.
89
  They have netted hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom 
and have disrupted global trade.
90
  Shipping companies using the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most 
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important and busiest shipping lanes,
91
 have faced increasing insurance rates.
92
  In addition, the increase in 
attacks, high shipping costs and fewer cargo ships have resulted in restricted humanitarian aid.
93
  Ships willing 
to bring food aid into the country have been cut in half, and World Food Program ships have not been immune 
from pirate attacks.
94
  This is especially detrimental to the population of Somalia, where 80% of food assistance 
from the UN moves by sea.
95
 
The numbers are staggering.  Even more staggering is the realization that given Somalia’s collapsed 
infrastructure, piracy can spread elsewhere.  Other African states, whether Somali neighbors or located further 
away, could fall prey to powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become firmly rooted in 
Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying Somali government support.
96
  Regional pirate networks 
could be created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human safety.
97
  Subsection B will look at 
these realistic global threats, specifically terrorism, and how a continued increase in strength and number of 
pirate organizations could result in terroristic affiliations. 
B. Piracy’s Link to Terrorism and its Global Implications 
Due to the ever present threat of terrorism at home and abroad for many western nations, acts of piracy 
may quickly become synonymous with acts of terror.
98
  From an organizational and operational point of view, 
the similarities are clear.  First, terrorists and pirates thrive in lawless regions, with terrorists finding safe haven 
in the remote mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
99
 and pirates flourishing in war-torn Somalia.
100
  Second, 
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modern pirates function on a highly organized scale at a supranational level.
101
  Their executioners function 
privately, beyond the sponsorship of any particular state, and their targets come from a variety of different 
states.
102
  The Somali pirates have gone after ships of many different nationalities so far, and the taken hostages 
have come from a myriad of different countries.
103
  Terrorists, likewise, have operated against many different 
nations and have harmed nationals of many different states.
104
  Lastly, both piracy and terrorism are a form of 
organized crime, with powerful masterminds and entire rings of executioners.
105
  In terms of fighting piracy and 
terrorism, going after the executioners may not do enough and instead, one may have to focus on the 
masterminds.
106
   
While recognizing that pirates and terrorists differ in one aspect, namely that the latter seems to function 
on the basis of a particular political or religious ideology, while the former, at least in Somalia, seems to be 
driven by purely financial gains,
107
 outside Somalia, pirates have smuggled weapons and delivered them to 
terrorist groups and have financially contributed to such groups.
108
  Most notably, during the 1990s and early 
2000s, when piracy was thriving in the Malacca Straits of Southeast Asia, reports indicated that pirates operated 
off an Indonesian island where the Aceh separatist group was fighting for autonomy and independence from 
Indonesia.
109
  It is widely believed piracy proceeded fueled the Aceh separatist movement by providing the 
group with the funds necessary to purchase weapons, train military groups, and engage in violent secessionist 
combat.
110
  Moreover, pirate ships routinely seize weapons from victim vessels, and may be involved in the 
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resale and smuggling of such weapons to terrorist groups.
111
  For example, in 2002, the Israeli Navy seized a 
vessel carrying a significant amount of weapons intended for the Palestinian Authority.
112
  
The “piratization of terrorism” could easily spread to Somalia, where militant factions linked to al-Qaida 
operate freely.
113
  Terrorism already has a foothold in the country; for example, authorities believe that a 
militant Islamist rebel group carried out a recent terrorist attack that lefty twenty-three people dead at a medical 
school graduation in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.
114
  This type of violence exemplifies Somalia’s 
volatility, vulnerability to militant Islamic groups, and the ability of terrorist groups to function with 
impunity.
115
 Reports on Somali piracy indicate that their operations are managed by powerful warlords who live 
on the Somali mainland; the attacks are executed by young men who are recruited from the poverty-stricken 
streets in coastal villages and towns.
116
  Similarly, powerful leaders, like Osama bin Laden, lead terrorist 
organizations, often hiding in lawless regions or geographically inhospitable areas, while terrorist attacks are 
virtually always executed by young men recruited in a systematic, carefully planned manner.
117
   
There is little doubt that there exists a real threat that Somali pirates will begin to engage in and begin 
affiliating with terrorist organizations.  Somali pirates are terroristic in nature and as their resources grow they 
will be powerful enough to be of sufficient importance to a terrorist group looking for a new source to obtain 
funds and weaponry.  This overlap between piracy and terrorism could easily be capitalized upon by the 
international community.
118
  While cognizant of the care that must be taken when applying the “terrorist” label 
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to piracy operations,
119
 this paper suggests that the connections between the two are more than just plausible.  
The aforementioned examples are direct proof of ties between piracy and terrorism in the past.  When taking 
into consideration the exponential escalation in Somali piracy over the course of the last five years, there is little 
reason to believe that a terrorist and Somali piracy group affiliation is not imminent.   
As a result, this paper suggests that a global initiative must be adopted in order to combat the Somali 
pirates as well as a preventive measure to stop the escalation of piracy into the realm of terrorism.  Part V will 
delve into this proposed initiative, highlighting the importance expanding the scope of the definition of piracy, 
the ICC adopting piracy within their jurisdiction, the option for domestic prosecution remaining available, 
continued regional partnerships, and heightened participation from maritime organizations and contact groups. 
V. Global Initiative to Combat Piracy and Prevent Pirate Affiliations with Terrorist 
Groups 
 
In order to prevent the destructive global impact that will ensue if the world allows piracy to continue to 
grow at a frightening rate, the international community must adopt an agenda that not only deters pirates from 
committing heinous acts, but also provides nations with the ability to successfully capture and prosecute.  
Specifically, the international community must adopt a definition that expands the scope of what constitutes an 
act of piracy.  Additionally, piracy must be adopted within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  Moreover, there needs to 
be an increased willingness by nations to prosecute domestically.  Lastly, a continued use of regional 
partnerships will provide a supplemental venue for prosecution.  These venues, with the support of international 
maritime organizations, will change the landscape of piracy captures and prosecution.  It will create a global, 
cooperative procedure for combating piracy, allowing nations to have an abundance of capturing and 
prosecutorial measures to employ. 
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A. Expanding the Scope of the Definition of Piracy 
 
There have been countless definitions for piracy throughout the course of history, both on a domestic 
and international level.  Domestically, each State has its own definition of the term “piracy,” which can often 
influence the way in which suspected pirates are charged and convicted in domestic courts.
120
  As mentioned 
above, many domestic statutes limit jurisdiction to acts of piracy against that nation’s interests.  On an 
international level, the most universally accepted definition of piracy was adopted by UNCLOS.  However, this 
definition, as well as the definitions adopted domestically by nations, is far too restrictive.  In order to create a 
platform that will allow for the successful capture and prosecution of pirates, a uniform definition must be 
adopted that encompasses acts of modern day piracy.   
This paper argues that the definition adopted by the SUA convention become universally recognized, 
both by States individually in their domestic statutes, as well as the international community as a whole.  The 
SUA Convention does away with the restrictive elements of the Convention on the High Seas/UNLOS 
definition of piracy.
121
   First, the SUA Convention does have the private aims requirement of the UNCLOS 
treaty; thus, maritime terrorist acts drive by politics and ideology, and not simply private aims, would fall within 
the SUA Convention framework.
122
  Second, the SUA Convention authorizes states to pursue maritime 
aggressors not only on the high seas, but anytime the victim vessel is in some form of international transit.
123
 
While the SUA Convention attempts to eliminate the restrictive elements of the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy, the former has not been as widely ratified and is not generally considered a part of customary 
international law.
124
  Regrettably, a number of countries most affected by piracy, such as Somalia, have not 
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ratified, the SUA Convention.
125
  Despite the absence of global ratification of the SUA Convention, this Author 
argues for the global ratification of its definition of piracy.  Its definition encompasses all the factors prevalent 
in modern day piracy.  In order to successfully battle modern day piracy, a definition that will include acts 
committed by pirates, regardless of their location or source of motivation, must be adopted. 
Additionally, the SUA definition solidifies the link between piracy and terrorism, by treating piracy as a 
form of maritime terrorism.
126
  Mindful of terrorists’ politically and/or religiously motivated agendas, the SUA 
definition expands the scope of the UNCLOS definition to include acts committed for both private and public 
aims.  Additionally, the Somali pirate organizations’ now operate as structured organizations.  As detailed 
above, the masterminds direct their attacks from inside Somali’s territorial waters and take refuge on Somalia’s 
land.  The SUA definition recognizes this problem and allows an act to qualify as “piracy” even though it is not 
committed on the high seas.
127
   
If adopted universally, it will provide the definitional foundation needed for States to successfully 
capture and prosecute pirates.  The definition allows for the acts of a pirate organization, conducted in 
affiliation with a terrorist group, to fit within its scope.  The following arguments, especially those for an 
increase in domestic prosecution and including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC, are premised on a 
definition of piracy that expands the scope of what constitutes a piratical act.  Part B addresses the importance 
of the ICC adopting piracy as a crime within its jurisdiction.  This expansive definition is critical to the 
successful implementation of piracy as a crime that can be prosecuted by the ICC.   
B. The ICC Must Adopt Piracy as a Crime Within its Jurisdiction 
                                                          
125
 Bahar, supra note 30, at 26 
126
 Sterio, supra note 34, at 389. 
127
 SUA Convention, supra note 44, art. 4 
21 
 
This paper argues that the ICC includes piracy as a crime within its jurisdiction.  The ICC came into 
existence in 2002, when the required number of states ratified the Rome Statute, thereby creating the court.
128
  
As of January 2010, 110 countries are states parties to the ICC.
129
  The crimes over which the court presently 
has jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
130
  When the Rome Statute was 
negotiated, piracy seemed to have vanished and certainly did not represent the issue of global magnitude that it 
does today.
131
  Thus, the ICC drafters may not have had enough of an interest or incentive to include the crime 
of piracy in the Rome Statute.
132
  Because piracy is a universal jurisdiction crime, it is logical that pirates would 
be prosecuted in the only universal criminal court.
133
  In fact, some scholars have already expressed regret that 
the ICC statute as originally drafted did not contemplate the crime of piracy.
134
  This Author is cognizant of the 
fact that the ICC was created with the aim of ending impunity for the perpetrators of “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”135  While it may be argued that acts of piracy, standing 
alone, may not amount to “the most serious crimes of concern” within the meaning of the ICC, it is this 
Author’s position that when acts of piracy begin to embody a terroristic personality, it breaks the “most serious 
crime” threshold and should be considered within the jurisdiction of the ICC.    
On its face, the idea of prosecuting pirates within the framework of the ICC seems counterproductive, 
using valuable international judicial resources and expenditures to fight random acts of financially motivated 
violence.  However, that vision no longer represents the true nature of a Somali pirate.  Pirate attacks are 
characterized by increasing cruelty and violence which will certainly not cease until pirates are brought to 
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justice.
136
  In fact, pirates are committing some of the very acts that are included within the definition of acts 
that can constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of an attack against a civilian population: 
namely murder, torture, and rape.
137
  When considering the organized structure of the evolving Somali pirate 
organization, coupled with a history of pirate ties with terrorist groups, it is clear that action must be taken by 
the ICC.  The potentially catastrophic destruction that these organizations acting alone, as well as in connection 
with terrorists could cause, both humanely and structurally, brings piracy well within the realm of the ICC 
drafters’ scope. 
Today, in light of the changed climate in Somalia and the dangers posed by piracy, major super powers 
may have sufficient political incentive to come together and to redraft the Rome Statute to include the crime of 
piracy.
138
  However, this process may only occur upon adoption by two-thirds of the states parties, which must 
then be ratified by seven-eighths of the states parties in order to take effect.
139
  Despite this paper’s assertions 
that the fight on piracy be a global measure, connoting the required amendment amounts being met, this paper is 
aware that these measures will take time to be ratified globally.  As a result, this paper does not argue that the 
Rome Statute be amended, but that an optional protocol (“the Protocol”) be adopted.  The Protocol will come 
into effect for those states that sign it,
140
 allowing those states who already recognize the global impact of the 
rise in piracy to sign on immediately, while affording those states that realize this issue down the road to sign at 
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a later date.  The Protocol should create a separate chamber within the ICC to handle piracy cases 
specifically.
141
 
Handling piracy within the framework of an optional protocol to the Rome Statute would deem 
questions of which states had or had not ratified certain treaties irrelevant.
142
  Piracy would be defined in 
connection with the Protocol.
143
  The crime of piracy can be readily defined.  This paper proposes that the 
definition to be used in connection with the Protocol be that adopted by the SUA, providing the ICC with a 
definition that allows all modern piratical acts to fit within its jurisdictional grasp.  One might expect that states 
would be very willing to ratify a protocol giving the ICC authority to prosecute piracy offenses.
144
  As will be 
discussed below, States are already turning pirates over to Kenya for prosecution, making it unlikely they would 
raise sovereignty concerns in connection with relinquishing suspected pirates to an international tribunal.
145
  
Also, many state representatives have already expressed support for an international tribunal to try piracy 
cases.
146
 
Additionally, the ICC is well-equipped with significant resources and personnel to handle the burden 
imposed by including piracy within its jurisdiction.
147
  This is not a situation where national courts have the 
resources and expertise to inexpensively and expeditiously try piracy cases.
148
  If a separate chamber is created 
to adjudicate piracy offenses, it will not distract the court from its other duties.
149
   The foundation is already in 
place, unlike in the situation of an ad hoc tribunal, which involves the formation of an entirely new tribunal.  
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The ICC already has a venue, governing statute, and personnel equipped to handle the addition of piracy as a 
crime within its jurisdiction.   
Because it is the duty of each state to exercise jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes, the jurisdiction of the ICC was created to be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction: it will 
only investigate and prosecute where a national state with jurisdiction over a case is “unwilling or unable to 
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.”150  Under the Rome Statute, “unwillingness” includes 
instances where national proceedings are a sham or are inconsistent with an intention to bring the person to 
justice, either because such proceedings are unjustifiably delayed or are inconsistent with an intention to bring 
the person to justice, either because such proceedings are unjustifiably delayed or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially.
151
  A nation’s “inability” to prosecute includes instances where, because of the 
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the nation cannot obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence, or is otherwise unable to carry out the proceedings.
152
   
Thus, nations may, and are encouraged to prosecute offenses nationally, but the ICC’s complementary 
regime provides another forum in which perpetrators can be brought to justice where national jurisdictions are 
either unwilling or unable to fight impunity.
153
  This criterion fits well within this Author’s proposed global 
initiative.  It is this initiative’s goal to promote domestic prosecution, but allowing a State with some form of 
hardship to have other methods of prosecution available.   
C. Increase Domestic Prosecutions 
Until recently, most states have had little incentive to spend the time and money associated with 
prosecuting pirates.  While acts of piracy affect a host of nations, it admittedly may affect each particular nation 
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minimally.  However, with the increase in organized piracy and the realistic potential of affiliations with 
terrorist groups, this paper argues that the incentive should now be considered a global one, warranting an 
increase in the willingness to prosecute domestically. 
States have used universal jurisdiction as a basis for prosecuting acts of piracy only in very few 
instances.
154
  Even more rarely used have been the UNCLOS and SUA Convention provisions.
155
  Despite the 
recognition that pirates are not being brought to justice and punished for their crimes, few nations are stepping 
up to prosecute suspected pirates.
156
  According to one report, between August 2008 and September 2009, some 
343 suspected pirates were caught by naval forces and disarmed and released, while only 212 were sent 
somewhere to be prosecuted.
157
  Failing to utilize universal jurisdiction and treaty provisions aside, some states 
do not even have national laws that criminalize piracy; and where states have such laws, they are not uniform in 
how they operate or the conduct they prohibit.
158
  As mentioned earlier, many domestic laws only allow for 
domestic criminal prosecution of pirates if they somehow threatened the national interests of the prosecuting 
state.
159
  Domestic statutes aside, States have demonstrated varying reasons for failing to prosecute pirates; 
namely because of the cost (may be cheaper to pay the ransom), little incentive in dealing with the piracy threat 
(do not have highly developed shipping industry), or simply want to avoid the hassle associated with 
prosecuting pirates (lengthy, burdensome on the nation’s judiciary).160  Despite these excuses, the most likely 
response to the piracy threat involves prosecution of captured pirates in the domestic courts of the capturing 
state.
161
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This Author’s proposal addresses all of the aforementioned issues asserted regarding the lack of 
domestic prosecution.  First, the definition to be adopted by States is a universal one.  It does not limit 
jurisdiction to acts against that particular State’s interests.  To the contrary, piracy was the first universal 
jurisdiction crime.  Consistent with that theme, domestic States should allow universal jurisdiction to fit within 
the realm of their piracy statutes.  Secondly, there is little doubt that the prosecution of pirates may incorporate 
significant costs and be burdensome on the nation’s judiciary.  This is precisely why this global initiative 
provides an assortment of venues for prosecution.  If a financial hardship truly exists, limiting the State’s ability 
to prosecute efficiently, other options remain available; such as the ICC or a regional partnership.  Lastly, this 
paper argues that the “little incentive” argument is moot.  Due to the expansion of Somali piracy and its 
imminent affiliation with terrorist groups, a global incentive is present.  Every nation now has an incentive to 
prosecute piracy domestically in order to create the perception of a coordinated global against piracy.   
Instead of bringing pirates to justice, a culture of impunity reigns, with captured pirates being released 
and permitted to continue their illegal activities.
162
  There must be a reversal to this culture of impunity.  In 
order to have any realistic hope of deterring pirates from engaging in the types of globally destructive acts that 
this Author fears are imminent, pirates must have a fear of being prosecuted if captured.  A global definition of 
piracy, adopted within the statue of each State, provides the foundation for an increase in domestic prosecution.  
As mentioned above, if a State has a true hardship that prevents efficient prosecution, other venues including a 
regional partnership, remain available. 
D. Continued Use of Regional Partnerships 
 Although states have generally refused to prosecute captures pirates in their own domestic courts with 
any regularity, they have not totally given up on the idea of bringing pirates to justice.
163
  Many nations instead 
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have recently turned to Kenya and its courts as a venue for prosecuting pirates captured off the coast of 
Africa.
164
  This paper proposes that these regional partnerships remain intact and continue to be utilized in 
appropriate circumstances. 
Numerous countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, among 
many others, have signed “Memorandums of Understanding” (“MOU’s”) with Kenya to prosecute captured 
pirates.
165
  These agreements are usually made in exchange for money and the promise to modernize Kenya’s 
court system.
166
  In return, these MOU’s provide that any pirates captured could be transferred to Kenya for 
prosecution.
167
   
While such prosecutions have yet to be utilized regularly,
168
 regional partnerships provide a number of 
significant advantages.  Trying pirates at a court in Kenya is seen as an alternative to trying pirates in Somalia’s 
courts, where there is no effective central government or legal system, as well as trying pirates in the capturing 
state’s courts, where finding translators, witnesses, or evidence is a sometime insurmountable difficulty.169  The 
prosecution in Kenyan courts provides a regional response to acts of piracy being committed in close proximity 
to its location.  As a result, regional partnerships present a method of prosecution to combat a localized crime 
that has a potentially global impact.   
Moving forward, while it is proposed that domestic prosecutions be favored over those conducted by 
regional partnerships, regional partnerships should remain an available option to a capturing nation.  If domestic 
prosecution is not feasible, prosecution in a Kenyan court is undoubtedly a viable solution on a case by case 
basis.  Regional trials may send a stronger deterrent message to existing pirates, who may hear and know more 
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about a Kenyan trial than an American or British proceeding.
170
  What better way to send a message that acts of 
piracy will no longer go unpunished than to prosecute offenders in a venue close to the waters that the acts are 
occurring on.  One of the primary purposes of executing a global initiative is to create a fear of imminent 
prosecution into the psyche of a Somali pirate.  In order to instill this fear and create a deterrent effect, regional 
partnerships should continually be utilized when the circumstances warrant.  
In addition to the various venues of prosecution, international maritime organizations need to be utilized 
as supplemental tools of combating piracy.  While this global agenda will create the necessary jurisdiction for 
capturing and prosecuting pirates, it remains imperative that the international community have supporting 
information to locate these piracy organizations. 
 
E. Maritime Organizations as Support Groups 
International maritime organizations can be utilized as essential support groups in the proposed global 
initiative against piracy.  These organizations can provide critical data to be utilized by nations in their search, 
capture, and prosecution of piracy law offenders.  Two main maritime bodies involved in anticipatory efforts 
include the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) and the International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”).171 
The IMO is described as “a specialized UN agency which is responsible for measures to improve the 
safety of international shipping and to prevent marine pollution from ships.
172
  The IMO administers several 
international agreements, some of which are aimed at combating piracy.
173
  Moreover, the IMO has helped to 
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raise security requirements for ships in ports, by enacting new, stricter regulations for port safety.
174
  Finally, 
the IMO manages routing schemes for international shipping; these schemes can help to prevent piracy by 
rerouting smaller vessels from pirate-infested waters or by providing security to all ships sailing through such 
dangers waters.
175
 
The IMB, on the other hand, is a branch of the International Chamber of Commerce and established a 
Piracy Reporting Centre in Malaysia in 1992.
176
  The centre collects piracy reports and broadcasts them to ships 
at sea; coast guards thus learn about piracy incidents quickly.
177
  Moreover, the centre is involved in locating 
hijacked ships and has made significant achievement in such efforts.
178
 
Collectively, these two maritime organizations possess information that is essential in the world’s fight 
against piracy.  With the use of these support groups, the international community will be able to communicate 
with each other, locating areas of potential pirate activity, as well as known locations of hijacked ships.  It is 
precisely this type of information sharing that the international community must utilize in order to locate the 
masterminds of pirate organizations and take a proactive approach in combating piracy.    
VI. Conclusion 
 
As exemplified above, piracy is a serious crime of international concern that is only increasing in 
frequency and severity despite the unique ways in which the international community has been working 
together recently in an effort to repress and combat piracy.
179
  While acts of piracy in Somalia are limited to the 
Gulf of Aden and the surrounding Indian Ocean, its impact is global.  The nature of Somali pirates and the way 
in which they conduct their attacks have become more brutal and systematic.  Somali pirates no longer function 
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on an individual agenda, but rather possess the characteristics of carefully calculated criminal organizations.  
Allowing piracy to escalate even further will continue to be detrimental on a global level, but create the 
potential for destruction on a larger scale.  This Author believes that affiliations between piracy organizations 
and terrorist groups are imminent.  The impact of the international community allowing piracy to become a 
contributing member to terrorist groups, through the distribution of weapons and funding, would be devastating.  
As a result, this paper argues for the implementation of a cooperative, global initiative by the 
international community to combat piracy.  Through the use of a universal definition of piracy, universal 
jurisdiction, the adoption of piracy as a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, an increase in domestic 
prosecution and regional partnerships, and the supplemental data and information provided by international 
maritime organizations, the international community can prevent merging of pirate and terrorist group affairs.  
More than that, this agenda will finally provide the platform for pirates to be captured, prosecuted, and 
convicted successfully.    
 
 
 
 
 
  
